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BENJAMIN, JOYCE AND THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF THE DEAD
GRAHAM MACPHEE
The idea of eternity has always had its strongest support in death. If this idea declines
[… then] the face of death must have changed. It turns out that this change is identical
with another – the one that has diminished the communicability of experience to the
same extent as the art of storytelling has declined.
--Walter Benjamin, “The Storyteller” (1936)

I

In Ulysses death is everywhere, immured in the present as memory, mourning,
ritual, tradition, allusion, etymology, or simply the iterability that is the
necessary condition of meaning. Indeed, consciousness seems to exist only as
the fraught and ultimately futile attempt to hold back the impatient and
ineluctable return of the dead—the “nightmare” of history from which Stephen
is trying to awake. And when the guard of consciousness is down, as in
Nighttown, the text stages a Judgment Day where “the dead of Dublin from
Prospect and Mount Jerome in white sheepskin overcoats and black goatfell
cloaks arise and appear to many”(U 526)
However, if death pervades the text, it does not function to mark, as
in T.S. Eliot, an immutable chthonic to set against the vagaries of historical
time. It is important not to underestimate Joyce’s figuring of death, for if the
appearance of the dead invokes traditional modes of belief, the conditions of
appearance are fundamentally modern. This modernity is perhaps nowhere so
striking as in the Hades episode, where Bloom’s profane imagination
undercuts both the Catholic Latin of the Requiem mass and the Protestant
English preferred by Tom Kernan. For Bloom, the promise of eternal life
collapses in a heap of bones and scattered organs, at whose center sits the
desacralized heart:
A pump after all, pumping thousands of gallons of blood everyday.
One fine day it gets bunged up and there you are. Lots of them lying
around here: lungs, hearts, livers. Old rusty pumps: damn the thing
else. The resurrection and the life. Once you are dead you are dead.
The last day idea. Knocking them all out of their graves. Come forth,
Lazarus! And he came fifth and lost the job. Get up! Last day! Then
every fellow mousing around for his liver and his lights and the rest
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of his traps. Find damn all of himself that morning. (U 107)

For all its comical ghoulishness, Bloom’s outlook is not without pathos
– as evidenced by his concern for Paddy Dignam’s bereaved son (“Poor boy!
Was he there when the father?”) (U 104). Indeed, both empathy and
irreverence can be understood as functions of that wider historical condition
we have come to associate with the secularization of death, a condition which
underlies Bloom’s practical turn of mind. The same practical outlook that
renders the heart a “rusty pump” pumping thousands of gallons a day
ultimately finds its corollary in the technical description of the Ithaca episode:
Did it flow?
Yes. From the Roundwood reservoir in county Wicklow of a cubic
capacity of 2,400 million gallons, percolating through a subterranean
aqueduct of filter mains of single and double pipeage constructed at
an initial plant cost of £5 per linear yard by way of the Dargle,
Rathdown, Glen of the Downs and Callowhill to the 26 acre reservoir
at Stillorgan, a distance of 22 statute miles. (U 591)

Here we find those myriad tendencies that have come to define modernity: as
the disenchantment of the world; as the subsumption of nature under the rule
of equivalence in commodity production; as the age of the world picture and
the advent of technology.
The practical turn of mind fixes the visible and, by extension, the
invisible within uniform spatio-temporal co-ordinates. Thus Bloom imagines
an underground world “all honeycombed” with “oblong cells”, muses on the
fertility of “the soil […] quite fat with corpse manure”, and speculates that
there would be “more room if they buried them standing up” (U 110). To the
practical mind, the invisible is subject to the same laws that govern the visible,
and in a sense we might identify a similar extrapolation from the sensory
world to the supersensible in modernity. It is not that the supersensible directly
mirrors the sensory world, but rather that the supersensible must recognize or
negotiate with profane temporality. Or to put it another way, in modernity our
conceptions of value and meaning must come to terms with the temporality of
technology.
In contemporary criticism, attempts to reorient our thinking of time
have been powerfully influenced by deconstruction, a critical perspective that
has found a particular affinity with modernism’s linguistic playfulness. In
“Ulysses Gramophone” (1984), Jacques Derrida famously invokes the
stuttering “Kraahraark! Hellohellohello” of the gramophone that Bloom
imagines as a complement to memorial photography, exploiting its
etymological double charge in order to reframe the temporality of the living
voice in terms of the technicity of writing.1 The gramophone stands as a figure
for the essay’s “preontological” (Derrida, “Ulysses Gramophone” 302)
conception of the double yes, which as a “universal presupposition” (Ibid.,
1

Jacques Derrida, “Ulysses Gramophone. Hear Say Yes in Joyce”, in Derek Attridge,
Acts of Literature (London: Routledge, 1992), 253-309.
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303) locates within “the manipulatory operation of hypermnesic
reappropriation” (Ibid., 304) the inevitability of “all the risks of technical
repetition, of automised archives, of gramophony, of simulacrum, of
wandering deprived of an address and destination” (Ibid., 305). In attempting
to restore life to the dead, in fact the gramophone reveals the necessary and
inevitable inherence of death in life, of absence and deferral in presence and
the present.
Derrida’s reading of Ulysses powerfully connects the temporality of
meaning with the technicity of “writing” as exemplified by the gramophone,
and perhaps still more in the essay, by the telegraph and the telephone. But
equally, it might be objected that the essay threatens to elide the temporal
specificity of techne in aligning it with a différance that is “preontological”
and a “universal presupposition”. Or, to put it another way, the essay’s
conception of technology risks hypostatizing death: for while it discovers
death in technology, it does not explore the historically variable technics of
death.
The aim of this study is twofold. First, it is to re-examine Joyce’s
figuring of death by looking at the last story of Dubliners, “The Dead”, a text
which dramatizes some of the risks involved in deconstructive readings of
Joyce. To do so it draws on Walter Benjamin’s critical study of Leskov in
“The Storyteller” (1936), which addresses the decline of storytelling through a
consideration of the historical transformation of death, which is closely linked
to the analysis of technology which occupied him at this time, and which finds
its most famous formulation in “The Work of Art in the Age of its Technical
Reproducibility” (1935/6).2 Unfortunately, this connection has largely been
ignored by English-speaking criticism, which has tended to dismiss “The
Storyteller” as exhibiting “a palpable nostalgia for a bygone era”.3 However,
2
“The Storyteller: Observations on the Works of Nikolai Leskov” and “The Work of
Art in the Age of its Technical Reproducibility”, both in Walter Benjamin, Selected
Writings, Volume 3, trans. E. Jephcott et al. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap-Harvard UP,
2002), 143-166 and 101-134. An early, unpublished draft of “The Storyteller”, entitled
“Little Tricks of the Trade”, is thought to have been written between 1929 and 1933,
which suggests that Benjamin’s engagement with the themes of “The Storyteller” is in
fact co-extensive with the composition of the Work of Art essay; see Walter Benjamin,
Selected Writings, Volume 2, trans. R. Livingstone et al. (Cambridge, MA: BelknapHarvard UP, 1999), 728-30. For an account Benjamin’s thinking of technology, see G.
MacPhee, “Glass before its Time, Premature Iron: The Unforeseeable Futures of
Technology in Benjamin’s Arcades Project”, New Formations 54 (2005).
3
Michael Jennings, Dialectical Images: Walter Benjamin’s Theory of Literary
Criticism (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1987), 8. Although this remains the most extensive study
of Benjamin’s literary criticism in English, the volume offers no further consideration
of the essay. For an alternative approach to Benjamin’s concept of criticism see
Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge,
1998), chapter 2.
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far from seeking to reconstruct an integral moment now past, “The Storyteller”
looks to identify different possible futures within the new condition of
narrative marked by the disappearance of storytelling. From this perspective,
Benjamin argues, “it is possible to find a new beauty in what is vanishing”.4
The second aim is to ask a broader question not just about literary
modernism, but about the “modernist criticism” of which deconstruction may
yet be judged a part. For if poststructuralists—from Barthes to Kristeva to
Derrida—elaborated their central intellectual terms and gestures by reading
formally self-conscious texts by writers such as Mallarmé, Proust, and of
course Joyce, then their critical positions—whether ostensibly positioned in
relation to these authors or not—must be recognized as part of the “afterlife”
of modernism. As such, the ways in which they remember, or repeat, or
rehearse the past cultural constellation of modernism takes on a wider ethical
or political significance. The history of Joyce criticism points with some
urgency to the stakes involved here: for in the trajectory from high modernist
formalist—whose texts perform a pure “revolution of the word” in which
historical determination is erased in a blinding jouissance—to the “subaltern”
Joyce of more recent postcolonial criticism—where the colonial project of
erasing and eliding the premodern and the precolonial is itself recognized as
part of the modernist text—the question of the appearance and disappearance
of historical determinacy returns.5 Understood in these terms, the afterlife of
Joyce’s text asks each critical perspective brought to bear upon it to what
extent it is able to register both the openness to futurity involved in its
experimental form—as linguistic indeterminacy or polyvocalism—and the
ways in which that formal experimentation may encode the historical
determinacy—the weight of dead generations, or “nightmare of history”—of
European colonial modernity. To the extent that the globalized present remains
determined by the moment of imperialism, this question remains unavoidable
for any critical practice that claims an ethical or political significance.

II

In “The Storyteller” Benjamin aligns the secularization of death in Europe
with his broader account of technology, a connection secured by an
4

Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 146; emphasis added. Subsequent references
to this work will be in the body of the text, abbreviated as SW3 and accompanied by
page numbers.
5
As significant points that might help plot this trajectory see for example Colin
McCabe’s James Joyce and the Revolution of the Word (London: Macmillan, 1978),
and Enda Duffy’s The Subaltern Ulysses (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1994).
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understanding of the nineteenth century as the “pre-history” of technological
modernity. “In the course of the nineteenth century”, the essay observes,
“bourgeois society—by means of medical and social, private and public
institutions—realized a secondary effect, which may have been its
subconscious main purpose: to enable people to avoid the sight of the dying”
(SW3, 151).
The importance of this shift for Benjamin lies in his understanding of
the role of death in the historical transformation of apperception—or the
spatio-temporal co-ordinates of cognition and perception which underlie
particular configurations of meaning, value and belief. As the essay recounts,
Dying was once a public process in the life of an individual, and a most
exemplary one; think of the medieval pictures in which the deathbed
has turned into a throne that people come toward through the wide-open
doors of the dying person’s house. In the course of modern times, dying
has been pushed further and further out of the perceptual world of the
living. It used to be that there was not a single house, hardly a single
room, in which someone had not once died[….] Today people live in
rooms that have never been touched by death—dry dwellers of eternity;
and when their end approaches, they are stowed away in sanatoria or
hospitals by their heirs. (SW3 151)

This account emphasizes the cognitive and perceptual significance of death by
stressing its constitutive role in structuring the “perceptual world of the
living”, and by identifying its visibility with instruction and communicability.
The disappearance of death therefore marks a crucial shift associated with the
rise of modern, technological societies, a shift which Benjamin describes in
terms of the decay of “experience proper” (Erfahrung) and the predominance
of “lived experience” (Erlebnis).6
Within this framework, the apperceptive conditions of meaning and
belief in pre-modern societies are understood to imply a spatio-temporal
continuum characterized by the community of creation and the eternity of the
Creator, rather than being restricted within the purview of the isolated
consciousness and its discrete life-span. Consequently, each individual death
finds its meaning within the continuity of “experience” (Erfahrung), a spatiotemporal configuration in which death appears as a recurring motif within the
texture of experience, not as the final limit or point of cessation. In “The
Storyteller”, this apperceptive arrangement is imaged in the vocabulary of
weaving and in the recurring figure of the medieval church clock with “its
revolving procession of creatures—a procession in which, depending on
circumstances, Death is either the leader or the last wretched straggler” (SW3
153). As Benjamin remarks in another instance, “this is an image for a
6

See the important essay “Experience and Poverty” (1933), in Benjamin, Selected
Writings, Volume 2, 731-5. The essay was published in Prague just months after
Hitler’s rise to power, and although brief, it provides a significant context for
understanding Benjamin’s writing through the 1930s.
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collective experience to which even the deepest shock in every individual
experience—death—constitutes no impediment or barrier” (SW3 157).
The emergence of the modern subject implies a quite different
structuring of apperception, which in turn transforms the nature of death.
While death can be assimilated or made meaningful within the experiential coordinates of the medieval world, from the standpoint of modern, atomized
subjectivity, death is external to meaning since it marks the cessation of lived
experience (Erlebnis). Death “disappears” in the sense that it becomes the limit
of an individualized experience, rather than a recurring constituent of
collective experience.
Understood in these terms, the disappearance of death marks a
transformation in the very conditions of meaning, a transformation which is
described in the Work of Art essay as the “shattering of tradition” (SW3 104)
and in “The Storyteller” as the decline of the communicability of experience
(SW3 143-4). Benjamin’s term Erfahrung designates an experiential matrix
which, despite continual modification, remains relatively stable over time, and
so implies a mode of transmissibility or tradition that includes both persistence
and destruction. The endurance of objects—whether linguistic or visual
artifacts, patterns of behavior or ritual, or social customs and institutions—
involves their reoccurrence within an interpretative context that is at once
comparable with and different to that in which they were produced. Objects
are therefore subject to reinterpretation, but within the confines of the relative
continuity of tradition: as such, interpretation involves a transaction or
negotiation between different configurations of experience. However, once the
conditions of experience are localized within the apperceptive subject as “lived
experience” (Erlebnis), the relative continuity engendered by the collective
patterning of Erfahrung is lost; therefore, each new experiential context is
radically discontinuous or incommensurable. While the object may
nonetheless be read or deciphered, interpretation now proceeds according to
the parameters of the existing conditions of experience, effacing the traces of
those in which it was produced.
The disappearance of death in the welter of lived experience therefore
marks a fundamental reformulation of the very terms of the historicity of
meaning—or of what Benjamin calls the “afterlife” (fortleben, nachleben) of
the work.7 This new condition is manifested for Benjamin in the prevalence of
“information” that accompanies the rise of the newspaper: “the value of
information”, the essay remarks, “does not survive the moment in which it was
new”, and so “it lives only at that moment” (SW3 148). Paradoxically, then,
while tradition involves both the continuing life and death of the transmitted
7

Benjamin’s notion of “after-life” is developed in “The Task of the Translator” (1922)
and “Goethe’s Elective Affinities” (1919-22), both in Walter Benjamin, Selected
Writings, Volume 1, trans. R. Livingstone et al. (Cambridge, MA: Belknap-Harvard
UP, 1996), 253-64 and 297-360.
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object, in lived experience what is transmissible is now only death—or the
failure of another context of experience to appear. Thus, as Benjamin observes
elsewhere, “the buried corpse” has become “the ‘transcendental Subject’ of
historical consciousness”.8
“The Storyteller” explores the prospects for narrative within this new
condition by way of a comparison between the different possible futures
signaled in turn by the story and by the novel form, which for Benjamin
includes the short story.9 However, the temporal orientation of this comparison
has been widely misunderstood, and underlies the accusations of nostalgia
leveled at the essay. Benjamin associates story and novel with, respectively,
Erfahrung and Erlebnis, in the sense that the structuring of each narrative
mode finds a particular affinity or compatibility with a different configuration
of experience; but this is not to identify a particular narrative mode with a
corresponding historical “stage”, nor limit its significance to a single point in
time.10 Indeed, the fundamental premise of the essay is that although the
experiential conditions which gave rise to the story are now lost, the story
“lives on”—not authentically or as it once was, but inauthentically.11 Its
analysis of the story is not an act of resurrection, which would disinter the
story and reconstruct it as it once really was, but an examination of its
“afterlife”, in which the story—like the vitriolized body of the young miner of
Falun in Leskov’s story “The Unexpected Reunion” (“Unverhofftes
Wiedersehen”)—reoccurs within changed historical circumstances to
unprecedented effect (SW3 152).
Understood in these terms, “The Storyteller” pursues two distinct
aims, although in the present context we are concerned only with the first of
these. Its initial task is to develop a critique of the novel that will respond to
the experimental tendencies we have come to associate with aesthetic
8

Walter Benjamin, “Central Park” (1938-9), trans. Lloyd Spencer, New German
Critique 34 (1985), 35.
9
“In point of fact”, writes Benjamin, modern humanity “has succeeded in abbreviating
even storytelling. We have witnessed the evolution of the ‘short story’, which has
removed itself from oral tradition and no longer permits the slow piling up, one on top
of another, of thin, transparent layer which constitutes the most appropriate image of
the way in which the perfect narrative is revealed through the layers of various
retellings” (Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 150).
10
In fact, Benjamin’s approach is even more dynamic than this summary suggests,
since the distinction of “story” and “novel” already marks a rethinking of the narrative
possibilities of epic; see Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 152-4.
11
Leskov was of course not a journeyman or medieval seafarer but, like Leopold
Bloom, a commercial traveler. His stories therefore do not mark the authentic return of
storytelling but its inauthentic after-life, as the essay repeatedly makes clear. More
broadly, Benjamin understands the condition of narrative within technological
modernity in terms of the after-life of the story, although again this return is
inauthentic; see note 13 below.
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modernism, but without falling back upon notions of progress or decline. Its
second is to generate an alternative framework for addressing the new
narrative forms generated by technological media like radio and film, in order
to provide a counterweight to the aesthetic categories inherited from
Romanticism and the Enlightenment.12 Thus, far from being an antiquarian
exercise, the essay proposes a double agenda whose outlook is decidedly
forward-thinking.

III

The comparison of the story and the novel form in “The Storyteller” is
designed to draw out the implications for narrative of the decay of collective
experience (Erfahrung) and the predominance of lived experience (Erlebnis).
Within the terms of collective experience, the course of the world and the fate
of the community are viewed as intimately entwined, so that the historical
experience of the collective provides the categories for understanding the
world. From this perspective, the relationship of events to one another is
continually modified according to the unfolding fate of the community, which
reinterprets its destiny in the light of its changing fortunes. In contrast, the
viewpoint of the modern subject is bereft of such an inherited experiential
context, wherein the unfolding of events would remain meaningful within the
terms of tradition—even if that meaning changes over time. Instead, the
subject is isolated from the course of events, and views them externally as a
fixed causal trajectory that ultimately ends in a discrete point or moment of
finality. Such a perspective is characterized by spatial individuation and
temporal fixity in its isolation and freezing of a succession of discrete
moments as the chain of cause and effect (SW3 152-3).
These different spatio-temporal configurations of meaning underlie
the essay’s comparison of story and novel. According to Benjamin, storytelling
does not pursue the unique narrative of an individualized personality, but
summons up “many diffuse occurrences” (SW3 154) within which the role of
protagonist “keeps shifting from figure to figure” (SW3 160). And because the
12
This second task predominates in the last four sections of the essay, and centers on
the different ways in which the fairy tale anticipates the condition of narrative in
modern technology; see Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 156-62. Although
largely ignored, this connection is in fact fundamental to Benjamin’s engagement with
technology: see the fragment “Mickey Mouse” (1931) and “Experience and Poverty”,
both in Benjamin, Selected Writing, Volume 2, especially 545 and 735; and the
discussion of Mickey Mouse in the Work of Art essay, where Benjamin observes that
technology’s “renew[al]” of “an old tradition” is not necessarily “reassuring”
(Benjamin, Selected Writings, Volume 3, 130n30).
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story anticipates a continuum of readability in tradition, it eschews the patterns
of cause and effect that emerge within the individualized viewpoint.
Consequently, it strives to remain “free from explanation”, so that although
“the most extraordinary, marvelous things, are related with the greatest
accuracy, […] the psychological connections among the events are not forced
on the reader” and “it is left up to him to interpret things the way he
understands them”. In contrast to the information that characterizes the
newspaper—“which does not survive the moment in which it was new”—the
story “does not expend itself”, but in the unfolding of tradition “preserves and
concentrates its energy and is capable of releasing it after a long time” (SW3
148). In being reinterpreted in tradition it is both reproduced and recast within
successively modified contexts of experience, so that its afterlife involves an
accumulation that is both an act of preservation and an act of destruction or
betrayal. In this way it can both “absorb the course of events […] and […]
make its peace with the passing of these, with the power of death” (SW3 1534).
In the novel, on the other hand, the spatio-temporal co-ordinates of
meaning are bounded by death, and so are locked within the individualized
compass of lived experience. However, far from lamenting the loss of
collective experience, this comparison is designed to generate a critical
framework which aligns contemporary literary experimentation with the
longer-term tendencies towards irony, parody and aesthetic self-consciousness,
which have characterized the novel from its inception. Benjamin’s aim is to
avoid a progressive conception of literary development, and instead to describe
the novel as a force-field of tensions whose coherence is perennially liable to
interruption, distortion and disfigurement.
The comparison between story and novel in the essay is first of all
designed to overturn dominant expectations about representationalism, which
extrapolates the novel’s power to render the “fullness” of experience from its
prosaic location in the profane world of modernity. From Benjamin’s
perspective, however, it is precisely because the novel is located “in the midst
of life’s fullness” and seeks to “represen[t] […] this fullness” that it “gives
evidence” not of the self-presence of life, but “of the profound perplexity of
the living” (SW3 146). For once the temporal continuum of tradition is lost,
inner experience becomes separated from the course of external events, and its
categories of meaning and value appear arbitrary and capricious—the source
not of confidence in the self-presence of meaning, but of “profound
perplexity”. The conflict between internal time consciousness and other modes
of narrative or historical time which characterizes the novel is understood as a
crucial manifestation of this perplexity. In the language of Lukács’ Theory of
the Novel (1920) which the essay invokes, this awareness of time is identified
as a function of the “transcendental homelessness” which is for Lukács the
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fundamental condition of the novel.13 Thus, in Benjamin’s view, the novel’s
rootedness in lived experience aligns it not with the communicability of
meaning and the fullness of life, but with incommunicability and loss: “To
write a novel”, remarks Benjamin, “is to take to the extreme that which is
incommensurable in the representation of human existence” (SW3 146).
The critical force of Benjamin’s approach lies in its articulation of
Lukács’ conception of the novel as “the form of transcendental homelessness”
(SW3 155). In the modern condition of transcendental homelessness, lived
experience is bounded by death, and so its assignment of value and meaning
remains arbitrary because internal and unrelated to the course of the world.
However, in the representation of lived experience provided by the novel,
events are invested with an apparently “necessary” meaning in their advance
towards “that death [which] is already waiting for them—a very definite death,
at a very definite place”, namely the literal or figurative “death” which marks
the end of the novel (SW3 156). The essay’s approach cuts across the notions
of empathy, identification, “reflection” and representationalism long
associated with the novel; for according to Benjamin,
The novel is significant not because it presents someone else’s fate to
us […] but because this stranger’s fate, by virtue of the flame which
consumes it, yields to us the warmth which we never draw from our
own fate. What draws the reader to a novel is the hope of warming his
shivering life with a death he reads about. (SW3 156)

Rather than recognizing death as a nonidentical moment of collective
experience, the novel integrates individual and world by identifying the
horizons of collective meaning with the individualized limits of lived
experience. But the “warmth” it thereby promises remains an empty hope,
since this identification only serves to consolidate the subject’s frigid isolation
and so confirm the cold arbitrariness of its unhappy fate.
The essay’s political critique of the novel form is underpinned by this
understanding of its generalization of an individualized conception of death.
However, the essay seeks to establish a critical framework that avoids blanket
judgments, and so its articulation of the tensions inherent in the novel allows
for developments that might nonetheless imbue the novel form with a critical
or illuminating charge. Thus, the condition of transcendental homelessness
generates “a basic structure of the novel”, a set of vectors or tendencies
inherent within the novel form with which individual works have to contend.
These tendencies are most clearly manifested in the Bildungsroman, which
according to the essay “bestows the most brittle justification” on the social
order “by integrating the social process with the development of the person”;
13
SW3 155. In effect, the essay draws out possibilities within Lukács’ theory of the
novel which have been almost entirely ignored within English speaking criticism. For
an account of the philosophical complexity of Lukács’ theory of the novel see J.M.
Bernstein, The Philosophy of the Novel. Lukács: Marxism and the Dialectics of Form
(Brighton: Harvester, 1984).
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thus, “the unattainable is event” (SW3 146-7).
However, the essay invokes a roll call of apparently quintessential
novels—from Don Quixote to Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre—which are
understood in fact to work against these tendencies by distorting the novel
form. The point here is not that such works escape the limits of the novel in the
sense of standing outside the condition of transcendental homelessness, but
rather that they are able to offer insights into this very historical condition
precisely by revealing the temporal specificity of their own configuration of
meaningfulness. Elsewhere, Benjamin locates this illuminatory potential in the
“death of intention” and “the mortification of works”—that is, in the process
of ruin or disfigurement which marks the “afterlife” of an apparently integral
configuration.14 For Benjamin, such instances offer an insight that exceeds the
limits of the novel form, precisely because in distorting its parameters they
bring into view something of its conditions of possibility.15 Seen from within
the ineluctable march of events towards their conclusion, the novel’s freezing
of lived experience imbues it with a meaningfulness that bears the appearance
of necessity; but when seen from “without”, this freezing works to crystallize a
particular structuring of meaning, whose configuration emerges in its
incompatibility with other contexts of interpretation.
Rather than understanding the novel form in terms of the rendering of
lived experience, “The Storyteller” argues that we should understand it in
terms of an “after-life” that follows death. For at the moment of death, the
essay reminds us, a “sequence of images is set in motion inside a man” which
grants to him “views of himself in which he has encountered himself without
being aware of it” (SW3 151).

IV

While “The Storyteller” approaches the novel form through the historicity of
death, Joyce’s short story “The Dead” invites a reassessment of the
conventions of prose fiction through its oblique invocation of the remembered
dead. But if in retrospect there appears to be an affinity between Joyce and
Benjamin here, “The Dead” has increasingly come to be seen as bearing
witness to the ethical dimension of poststructuralist practices of reading.
Joyce’s text therefore provides an opportunity for examining the contemporary
significance of Benjamin’s critical framework.
14

Walter Benjamin, The Origin of German Tragic Drama, trans. J. Osborne (London:
Verso, 1977), 36, 182.
15
For a fuller account of the dynamics of Benjamin’s thinking here see G. MacPhee,
The Architecture of the Visible: Technology and Urban Visual Culture (London:
Continuum, 2002), 186-193.
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In “Joyce’s ‘The Dead’: The Dissolution of the Self and the Police”,
John Riquelme sets out to refute the charge that Joyce’s short story enacts an
irresponsible dissolution of the self in “the free play of language [celebrated]
by poststructuralists” such as Jacques Derrida and Julia Kristeva.16 He argues
instead that “the dissolution of the self” described by the text does not entail
the loss of political agency but “the exposure of delusion” (Riquelme 124).
“The Dead” therefore performs an ethical deconstruction, a performance which
involves the reader in a process of dissolution and exposure elicited by the
recognition of the inevitability of death. As such, Riquelme writes, the text
“provides the opportunity for a recognition of human limits that can help make
freedom, with all its risks and uncertainties, possible” (139).
Riquelme’s reading conceives of “The Dead” as tracing two parallel
trajectories of dissolution that move from plenitude to vacuum. The first
centers on the figure of Gabriel Conroy, who “encounters the inevitability of
his own death” in hearing his wife Gretta’s story of lost love, and so “loses
[…] his sense of being at the pinnacle of multiple hierarchies” (Riquelme 132).
This moment of crisis “creates a vacuum where previously there seemed to be
a plenitude”, a process described as “the emptying out of the previously full
image” of the self that enables “the potential transvaluation of everything
[Gabriel] thought he knew” (Riquelme 139). The second trajectory, which
shadows the first, involves the narrative’s shifting positioning of the reader.
The reader begins with a “deluded sense of stability [that] corresponds to
Gabriel’s pose of knowing and controlling” (Riquelme 135), a stability that is
progressively undermined by “the increasing use of the free indirect style” in
the final moments of the short story (Riquelme 125). This process reaches its
apogee in Gabriel’s final repetition of the phrase from the newspaper spoken
earlier by Mary Jane—that “the snow was general all over Ireland”.17 This
repetition is understood as “a choral speaking” which “involves a blurring of
the boundaries of the individual speaking self” and the articulation of “a group
speech whose content implies the equality of all members” (Riquelme 138).
For Riquelme, “the dissolution of the character’s self is communicated and
transferred [to the reader] through free indirect style”, so that “our own stance
as the spectator who possesses knowledge and control is destabilised” (139,
135).
The ethical force identified by this reading depends on its
understanding of the text’s figuring of death. For Riquelme, death is conceived
in opposition to “the culturally generated shapes and boundaries of hierarchical
16
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James Joyce, Dubliners (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1956), 220. All subsequent
references will be to this edition, with page numbers given in parentheses in the body of
the text.

162
difference”, as a “lack that resists being rationalised” (138-9); its recognition
therefore constitutes a “truth that strenuously resists being eradicated by
deluded self-representations and by self-perpetuating social hierarchies” (134).
As such, the moment of crisis that accompanies Gabriel’s sudden awareness of
mortality at the end of the short story is “not […] an experience of
undecidability but [… a] decidedly unambiguous recognition of eventual
death” (Riquelme 132). In these terms, Riquelme’s reading deploys the
premonition of certain death against the ambiguity of appearance that
characterizes the world of social differences, and consequently death comes to
function as a principle of equivalence or indifference. For Riquelme, Gabriel’s
recognition of “the mortality he shares” with the women he had earlier sought
to dominate and master enables him to understand that in the dance of death
“all partners are equal” (131, 139).
In the light of Benjamin’s essay, what is perhaps most striking about
this account is its untheorized assumption of an individualized conception of
death—“the obvious fact”, as Riquelme puts it, “that the survival of the
individual is limited” (139). Such a conception of death—as a “vacuum” or
point of indifference that stands in opposition to the differentiated appearance
of the social world—adopts the standpoint of the isolated subject, for whom
death looms as the cessation of meaning, an emptiness that is undifferentiated
and absolutely unknowable. As Riquelme concedes, although without
exploring its consequences, the critical perspective that governs his reading is
located “this side of death”, and so its outlook remains centered on the journey
from delusion to knowledge performed by the dominant consciousness of the
narrative, Gabriel Conroy (138; emphasis added). Read from within the drama
of isolated consciousness, the events of the short story—no matter how
apparently inconsequential or arbitrary—assume a meaningfulness in relation
to this overarching trajectory, forming an abbreviated Bildungsroman in which
interiority finds its truth in the unfolding course of the world (SW3 150). Thus,
despite its claim to base its ethics in an analysis of the performativity of the
text, Riquelme’s reading restricts the short story’s formal dynamics within an
individualized conception of death—as a Bildungsroman of dissolution.
In fact, the dynamics of Joyce’s text exceed the parameters of the
Bildungsroman in terms that anticipate Benjamin’s critique of the novel form
in “The Storyteller”.18 Although Riquelme claims that Gabriel’s journey from
delusion to certainty is accompanied by “an increased use of free indirect
style” in the final moments of the short story, it is very difficult to identify any
such gradient, or to chart a progressive destabilization or distancing of the
reader (Riquelme 125). Rather, free indirect discourse is deployed throughout
18

The text repeatedly ironizes the congruence of inner and outer meaning dreamed of
by the Bildungsroman: thus, just before Gretta’s disclosure, Gabriel muses that
“perhaps her thoughts had been running with his”, and then proclaims “I think I know
what is the matter” (D 214, 215).
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“The Dead”—as Riquelme’s own reading in fact indicates—and we are never
allowed to assume the reliability of any narrative viewpoint or align our
interpretation with a neutral, authoritative narrative voice. This uncertainty is
demonstrated at the outset when Gabriel and Gretta arrive to be greeted by the
maid Lily: the disjunction between the rendering of Gabriel’s surname in
reported speech (“Is it snowing again, Mr Conroy?”) and his internal
recognition of Lily’s “non-standard” pronunciation (“Gabriel smiled at the
three syllables she had given his surname”) underlines the unreliability not
simply of narration, but even of direct discourse, which presents itself as a
neutral medium of report (D 175). The accumulated effect of this pervasive
destabilization is to generate an awareness of the text as a particular
configuration of meaningfulness, rather than simply pursuing the meaning(s)
available within the unfolding of the narrative. Or, in terms of our discussion
of “The Storyteller”, while we inevitably read “The Dead” from within the
drama of Gabriel’s consciousness—so following the journey from delusion to
recognition—the text constantly invites us to examine from “without” the
structuring of apperception which underlies this drama.
The parameters of this configuration begin to obtrude in moments of
anxiety, when Gabriel projects a fantasy world whose comforting co-ordinates
correspond to the patterns of his own consciousness in a way that the
experiential world of other consciousnesses does not. So, after his
uncomfortable conversation with Miss Ivors, who jokingly accuses him of
being a “West Briton”, Gabriel takes refuge in the imaginary landscape of a
Phoenix Park dominated by the obelisk commemorating Arthur Wellesley,
Duke of Wellington:
How pleasant it would be to walk out alone, first along by the river
and then through the park. The snow would be lying on the branches
of the trees and forming a bright cap on the top of the Wellington
Monument. How much more pleasant it would be than here at the
supper-table! (D 189)

Again, just before his after-dinner speech, Gabriel calms his nerves by
transporting himself back to the park, where “the Wellington Monument wore
a gleaming cap of snow that flashed westwards over the white field of the
Fifteen Acres” (D 199). The fantasies to which Gabriel’s consciousness
retreats at such moments of anxiety provide glimpses into its apperceptive
configuration, the co-ordinates of space and time which underpin perception
and meaning. In the cartography of Gabriel’s consciousness, the symbolic
power of the “Iron Duke”—a native Dubliner who more than any other came
to embody the military and political dominion of the British Empire—
coincides with the monumental architecture of the obelisk, whose domination
of the surrounding landscape reduces it to a uniform and undifferentiated
blankness.19 So, when confronted by orders of experience which exceed its
19
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own parameters of understanding—moments which significantly culminate in
the playful but pointed charge of his succumbing to an unmanly colonial
subservience by a woman who is both modern in her anti-imperial feminism,
yet proud of an Irish culture that recalls the premodern (however
problematically)—the fabric of Gabriel’s consciousness is restored by the
recall of the idealized spatio-temporal configuration embodied in the
monument to the imperial Irishman par excellence—Arthur Wellesley, victor
of Waterloo, British Prime Minister, and first Duke of Wellington.
Throughout the short story, Gabriel maps the physical and semantic
geography of Dublin through the triangulation of three significant monuments:
alongside the Wellington Monument, the statues of William of Orange and
Daniel O’Connell also feature as key reference points in Gabriel’s negotiation
of his social world.20 But more than this, the parameters of his imagination and
understanding are imperial and monumental, in that the heterogeneity of lived
experience—in which the modern and premodern, the Irish and British, the
Protestant and Catholic, the masculine and the feminine, are continually both
demarcated and conflated—is fixed and ordered as a uniform panorama
radiating from the central pinnacle of his own consciousness. This is a
consciousness that sees itself at once as modern and therefore beyond national
identification (figured by the abstract geometry of the obelisk), and yet as
somehow secretly and properly British (architecturally trumping the Oriental
obelisk brought by Napoleon to stand in the Place de Concord, just as
Wellington humbled the French Emperor at Waterloo). And as such, it is a
configuration of consciousness that can assert its own integrity and dominance
through resort to a violence which does not need to be justified, for what falls
within its purview becomes inert material awaiting refashioning and entry into
the fullness of the present and the modern. Thus, Gabriel’s fierce projection of
his own anger and sexual desire during their journey back to the hotel renders
Gretta as a stiff and lifeless stage property within his fantasies of romantic love
and sexual conquest; and so he fails to register what is made increasingly clear
to the reader—namely that Gretta is mourning her lost love, the dead boy
Michael Furey.
The apperceptive co-ordinates of Gabriel’s consciousness emerge
most clearly in the doubled and interrupted nature of his final “epiphany”. For
Gabriel initially assumes that Gretta’s thoughts are directed towards the living,
an assumption that betrays an imagination which restricts possibility within the
constitution of the modern nation-state see Georges Bataille, “The Obelisk”, in Visions
of Excess, trans. Alan Stoekl (1938; Manchester: Manchester UP, 1985), 213-22.
20
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settlement that would in Gabriel’s eyes reconcile Protestant Unionism and Catholic
Ireland—that is, through the imperialist identification of political authority and military
force.
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opposed poles of presence and absence—just as the visible world is reduced to
the homogenous substantiality of the monumental. What unsettles Gabriel is
not this first revelation—that Gretta might love another—but rather the
second—that her love might be extended to one among the dead. The
endurance of Gretta’s love for Michael Furey within a world in which he is
absent introduces a prospect that exceeds the parameters of Gabriel’s
imagination—the persistence of a different possible future within a present in
which it was not actualized, and so cannot appear.

V

Rather than remaining within the terms of the narrative of Gabriel’s
consciousness, Benjamin’s critique of the novel form focuses attention on the
fragility of the Bildungsroman’s alignment of inner and outer meaning. As
such, it draws attention to the text’s formal ironies and questions the very
notion of “epiphany” or “revelation”. But furthermore, it extends the
parameters of reading by asking not only how Gabriel’s consciousness is
structured, but also how this structuring compares with other possible
configurations.
Seen from within the drama of Gabriel’s consciousness, the moment of
revelation marks the dissolution of delusion, and so constitutes a watershed in
understanding; but seen from the perspective of the apperceptive co-ordinates
of understanding, this moment does not mark a qualitative change. From the
outset, Gabriel’s outlook assumes a uniform world of substantiality, an array
of statues whose homogeneous solidity defines the self-presence of the living
now. Such a perspective implies and takes shape from its corollary, a pure
absence or vacuum that constitutes a realm of death uncorrupted by the social
differences and hierarchies of the living. Thus, the netherworld of the dead that
appears in the penultimate paragraph inhabits the same co-ordinates as his
monumental vision of the living, “a grey impalpable world” that supplies the
negative image for “the solid world itself”:
The tears gathered more thickly in his eyes and in the partial darkness
he imagined he saw the form of a young man standing under a
dripping tree. Other forms were near. His soul had approached that
region where dwell the vast hosts of the dead. He was conscious of,
but could not apprehend, their wayward and flickering existence. His
own identity was fading out into a grey impalpable world: the solid
world itself, which the dead had one time reared and lived in, was
dissolving and dwindling. (D 219)

But it is not Michael Furey who appears here: what appears, in fact, is the
imagined “form of a young man” who is one among many “other forms”,
featureless and undefined. Just as Gabriel’s earlier fantasies solipsistically
reduce Gretta to the parameters of his own imaging and desire—whether as the
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sentimental image he titles Distant Music, or more brutally in his desire “to
crush her body against his [and] overmaster her”—so this image reduces the
myriad complexity of the relations between living and dead to an
undifferentiated projection of his own anxiety (D 214). For although this
fantasy imagines the dissolution of the ego in the recognition of shared
mortality, it is Aunt Julia who joins the dead in Gabriel’s imagination, while
Gabriel himself undertakes the onerous task of consoling the living, as much at
the center of things as when he carves the goose at the dinner table.
Like the Wellington monument, whose imperial architecture reduces
the surrounding landscape to a uniform and undifferentiated blankness,
Gabriel’s conception of death smothers all differences among the dead,
freezing and homogenizing their variegated and constantly shifting
relationships with the living. Far from constituting a “choral speaking”, the
final imagined scene of the snow “general all over Ireland” offers a complex
image of the desires buried deep within the novel form. The harmony of
interior and exterior dreamt of by the Bildungsroman may appear as old as
nature, but as this image reminds us, it is in fact a function of a world split
between the isolated subject and the disconnected events which confront it
every morning in the newspaper.
If Benjamin’s critique of the novel form emphasizes the limits of
Gabriel’s imagination, it also draws attention to an engagement with the dead
that Riquelme’s reading neglects—one which unfolds not in Gabriel’s
imagination, but in Gretta’s story of lost love. However, Gretta’s storytelling
demands a complicated kind of double reading, since the text denies us access
to her interior life and her story is available only through the mediation of
Gabriel’s limited perspective. But this means that, in Benjamin’s words,
Gretta’s account is stripped of “the psychological connections among the
events”, leaving it “free from explanation”; and so it is “restored” to something
that resembles—although inauthentically—the condition of the story (SW3
148). Though filtered through Gabriel’s point of view, the text suggests the
lineaments of another configuration of experience in the temporal ambiguity
introduced at the moment she recalls the image of her lost love. In contrast to
the temporal consistency of Gabriel’s narrative viewpoint, Gretta’s account of
her last encounter with Michael Furey is characterized by an oscillation of
tenses:
I implored him to go home at once and told him that he would get his
death in the rain. But he said he did not want to live. I can see his
eyes as well as well! He was standing at the end of the wall where
there was a tree. (D 218)

While Gabriel’s vision can see only “the solid world” of the living or the “grey
impalpable world” of the dead, Gretta’s storytelling suggests a different
configuration of experience. In shifting from the past tense of retrospective
narration to the present tense—“I can see his eyes as well as well!”—Gretta
testifies to the paradoxical living on of a moment that is dead and gone.

167
Gretta’s storytelling, then, marks the appearance of a mode of experience that
can no longer appear in the world of the novel—and so it appears negatively,
in its difference to and incommensurability with the configuration of Gabriel’s
consciousness.
Despite its claim to center on the recognition of difference,
Riquelme’s reading inadvertently equalizes Gretta’s memory of Michael Furey
and Gabriel’s undifferentiated world of shades—reducing them both to the
homogenous multitude of “the dead”. But as the short story reminds us by
placing Michael Furey—the “boy in the gasworks”—alongside that other
representative of the departed—Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington—the
dead are not the same, and the differences and hierarchies that separate them
do not simply fade away on their demise (SW3 216). Though Riquelme locates
an ethical charge in the liquidation of social “boundaries of hierarchical
difference” he sees at the story’s conclusion (Riquelme 138), in doing so he
erases the historical determinacy that exists not as a “content” to be
“represented”, but embedded in its configuration of meaning. If British
colonialism itself erases or overwrites other histories—as premodern, and as
such nonsensical or without meaning—so that they cannot appear within the
colonial text, such histories may leave their mark or imprint in the warps and
distortions they produce in the very configuration of meaning which seeks to
exclude them—as we have seen in the return of Greta’s storytelling within the
parameters of Gabriel’s imperial and monumental perspective. In erasing the
differences among the dead, Riquelme obscures the determinate absence of
what has been lost and so cannot appear, the determinate history of erasure
and loss which allows British imperial culture to present itself paradoxically as
a modernity that is without nation yet always at home, a universality that is
somehow particular to itself.21 In its ethical concern for an opening to futurity,
Riquelme’s deconstructive reading elides the historical determinacy of a past
which has been lost and cannot appear, but which continues to organize the
hierarchies and distinctions that underpin the postcolonial present. What this
elision suggests, therefore, is that the differences which distinguish among the
dead, and tie them to the fate of the living, are not static, but have their
afterlife in the stratified and uneven space of transmission that patterns the
conflict between individual and collective memory, and organizes the
parameters of meaning.
Reading Joyce’s text through the frame of “The Storyteller” is not
merely an antiquarian exercise, since the interplay between the historicity of
death and the configuration of meaning staged by these two texts has itself
become a central issue for contemporary criticism. Our own critical moment
has been powerfully defined by the recognition of the inherence of death in the
21
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apparent fullness of meaning, where death is both the necessary condition of
meaning—as repetition or iterability—and its inescapable undoing, its
irrevocable openness to futurity. In “Ulysses Gramophone”, this doubleness is
articulated as “the yes of memory, with its recapitulating control and reactive
repetition”, and “the light, dancing yes of affirmation, the open affirmation of
the gift”, a pairing which registers both the weight of memory and repetition,
and the continual opening of this repetition to difference and futurity. But in
order to avoid being caught up in a progressive dialectic, Derrida insists that
these terms “refer to each other without having any relationship between
them”.22 As such, death becomes the matrix of meaning and desire, yet it
cannot be known in its historical determinacy, and so risks being hypostatized
as an inert and empty vacuum, rather than being recognized in each moment of
its constantly changing (dis)appearance in the present.
Riquelme’s reading of “The Dead” dramatizes some of the risks
involved in attempting to locate an ethical charge in such a conception of the
unchanging and unknowable certainty of death. For as our reading of Joyce’s
text suggests, if we cannot trace anything of the relationship between
memory’s return and the articulation of difference, then we are unable to
register how the history of return reconfigures the conditions of articulation. In
this case, the ethical concern for openness to futurity becomes, at best, little
more than piety, and, at worst, a new mode of self-deception, since it cannot
distinguish how the differences among the dead may in their afterlife come to
reinforce and reproduce the hierarchies of the living.
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